Computerized election systems

Mid-term elections are approaching, and on November 2, 2010, many precincts will continue to use electronic voting machines. The notion that a technologically sophisticated country ought to use the most advanced technology for its voting system is attractive at the outset. Increased speed and efficiency are signs of progress. Certainly the machines are quicker than we are and are not prone to fatigue. But the use of electronic voting systems is risky: they can be every bit as corrupt as humans can be in the worst cases.

The manufacturers of the electronic systems try to reassure us that the safeguards they employ throughout design, production and deployment guarantee that honesty and accuracy will prevail in the processing of ballots. But because computerized voting systems do not have immediate double-checks by humans at every stage of data collection and transmission, these systems cannot inspire high confidence in the accuracy of the tabulation of votes.

The manufacturers of electronic election systems refuse to make their programs public. On the one hand, this protects company secrets and the right to profit from the sale of products, and this minimizes the exposure of the software to potential hackers. On the other hand, it helps to conceal election fraud where it might occur.

Because we cannot directly observe the fundamental operation of those machines, we cannot see whether they are working correctly. We are in effect trusting the outcome of our elections to the workings of a black box or to a man behind a curtain.

Drug manufacturers, for example, follow policies and procedures that aim to make all their products safe. Even so, product tampering is conceivable. But with adulterated medications, we could presume a cause from the observation of certain adverse effects: sickness and death are possible results of tampering, and if we notice those, we could go on to determine who or what was responsible for the adulteration.

The naked eye cannot usually see the difference between a properly functioning and a malfunctioning computer chip. Sophisticated tests using specialized equipment are often necessary to observe defects in these components. Nor does the output of computer programs always easily reveal whether the programs are working as intended by their creators or as desired by their users. Tampering with electronic devices or corrupting software could produce effects that never lead us to question who or what produced them. And the possible effects of this sort of tampering include changes in the outcomes of elections and resulting changes in the course of history.

Sometimes simple mechanical components are superior to electronics. The functioning of a simple mechanical device is readily apparent, its malfunction is easily detected, and its repair is usually straightforward. Whatever mechanical, optical or electronic systems are used to assist in the capture and tabulation of votes, the systems should be completely transparent and their results completely verifiable. With nuclear weapons and voting machines, there should be a major emphasis on verification and very little reliance on trust.

In most circumstances, the use of paper ballots as the original and primary documents associated with voting, counted simultaneously by representatives of opposing parties, is a method that inspires far more confidence in the validity of results than does the use of any computerized election system.