Strong encryption in consumer electronics

BlackBerry offers a couple of services that trouble officials in India: the BlackBerry Messenger Service (BMS) and the BlackBerry Enterprise Service (BES). The government of India wants access, by the end of this month, to the information transmitted through these services. The reason for concern is that the encryption used in BMS and BES is so strong that authorities cannot readily crack it.

All BlackBerry devices offer relatively secure communication. Yet among the many users of the BlackBerry, some favor the device because, when it employs BMS or BES, it affords extremely secure communication. Many firms want maximum protection for communications among their executives, because they want to protect strategic plans and trade secrets.

But many, perhaps all governments, if they do not have access to the keys for decryption, view strong encryption as a potential threat. They argue that criminals and enemies of the state can use highly encrypted messages to advance illegal activities and even subvert a society.

The central government, as the ultimate protector of national security, has an interest in retaining certain powers and denying them to regional or local governments and to the citizenry. The powers it holds to itself are few but crucial. Relevant in this context are these: (1) the power to prohibit in consumer electronics encryption that governmental authorities cannot crack and (2) the power to appropriate for itself the latest, most powerful algorithms for encryption from wherever they emerge.

In any event, now that the technology of encryption is no secret--the know-how is widely available in several published sources--governments can never be completely in control of the transmission of information. Highly motivated, well-educated and adequately funded companies and individuals can develop and employ strong encryption for whatever purposes they choose. Those with the greatest need for secure communications and who have the resources to afford them will create and maintain their own networks.

At issue here is whether authorities should deny consumers the right to use devices that employ encryption that is stronger than intelligence agencies are able to master. They certainly can deny consumers the right, and that is what India has in mind. At least, the authorities want to minimize the number of potential threats to their nation.

Nevertheless, if governments may be threatened by secrecy, citizens may be threatened by revelation. If governments can monitor any communication they choose, they could violate some of the hard-won freedoms that citizens prize, freedoms on which they have come to rely.

And quite naturally, the makers of devices for communication that employ encryption want to make money. They face the challenges of getting permission to do business in certain countries and thereby gaining access to large new markets.

To balance the conflicting needs and demands, the parties involved will have to negotiate, and someone will have to compromise. The makers of hardware and the operators of networks may have no choice but to allow governments to gain some ability to access the information transmitted by and stored on their systems. While a compromise of this sort may open new markets for Research In Motion (RIM), the maker of the BlackBerry, it may also limit the appeal of the product to certain customers.

Yet even if all or most of the concessions come from RIM, the loss to that company need not be great. If governments apply restrictions to all manufacturers and networks equitably, and extremely strong encryption is not available in any device for consumers, then the BlackBerry will still compete with similar products on a level playing field.

Most consumers are unlikely to give much thought to whether they use the strongest forms of encryption. Most of us are satisfied if our phone conversations and emails are not readily available to anyone other than the parties to whom we intended to send them.

Given that officials will seek and win specific permission from duly appointed authorities to monitor the transmissions of information by particular parties or along certain channels exclusively for the purpose of protecting the nation from threats to its security, the notion of prohibiting the use of the strongest methods of encryption in consumer electronics makes good sense. This restriction can serve the most important interests of most people in the country.

Often the best that anyone can do is cut a deal that offers the greatest good for the greatest number. National security and the prevention of the most serious crimes are two good reasons for giving to trusted governments the power to restrict the use of highly encrypted communications.